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Abstract 
In occasion of the European Parliament elections of 2014, EUDO launched euandi (reads: EU and I). 
The academic relevance of the euandi endeavour lies primarily in its choice to stick to the party 
positioning methodology already employed by the EU Profiler in 2009 as well as in the choice to keep 
as many policy items as possible in the 2014 questionnaire in order to allow cross-national, 
longitudinal research on party competition and voting behaviour in the EU across a five-year period. 
In this paper, we present the euandi project in a nutshell, the making of the questionnaire and the way 
in which political parties have been coded. Then, we illustrate the functioning of the application and 
the specifics of the resulting user dataset, comprising the opinions of 400.000 unique users that 
completed the euandi questionnaire during the six weeks preceding the EP elections of 2014. 
Keywords 
European elections, party placement, Voting Advice Applications 
 1 
Introduction1 
Voting Advice Applications (hereafter: VAAs) are web-based tools that help users casting a vote in 
elections by comparing their policy preferences on major issues with the programmatic stances of 
political parties on such issues (for a comprehensive overview of the VAA phenomenon in a 
comparative perspective, see: Cedroni and Garzia, 2010; Garzia and Marschall, 2012; 2014). 
Respondents fill in a questionnaire marking their degree of (dis)agreement with a wide range of 
concrete policy statements. After comparing the user’s profile with that of the parties included in the 
tool, the VAA provides an illustration of the degree of issue proximity between the user and the 
parties. VAAs attract users because they simplify the complex, multi-dimensional pre-electoral stances 
of political parties. Indeed, the tailor-made information on users’ positions in the political landscape is 
enormously appreciated. Today, in countries such as Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland the availability of one or more VAA during an electoral campaign can be taken for 
granted (for an overview of the spread of VAAs across Europe, see: Marschall, 2014). And they are 
rather extensively used by citizens. To give a few examples, in the run-up to the 2012 parliamentary 
election in the Netherlands, 4.9 million users resorted to the pioneering VAA StemWijzer. In absolute 
numbers, the German Wahl-O-Mat launched before the Federal elections of 2013 was consulted by the 
largest number of users ever, i.e., 12.3 million.  
VAAs have not only been deployed on the national level. In the six weeks preceding the European 
elections of 2009, the transnational VAA EU Profiler, developed under the auspices of the European 
Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO) based at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence, 
attracted over 2.5 million users and 900.000 completed user profiles. In 2009, the EU Profiler was 
awarded the World e-Democracy Forum Award for its “commitment to carry out meaningful political 
change through use of the Internet and new technologies”. Apart from the aim to offer a tool that 
allows voters to inform themselves on the elections and the European political landscape, the EU 
Profiler team had a strong academic interest in gaining research data related to the European elections. 
The coding of over 270 European parties has in fact resulted in an immense database on the positions 
of European parties on current political issues (see: Trechsel and Mair, 2011). The opinions of almost 
one million users complemented one of the biggest datasets on European voters’ attitudes and 
behaviour ever assembled. Research conducted by EUI members on EU Profiler generated data has 
led to numerous book chapters and articles published in highly-ranked journals such as European 
Union Politics, Journal of Information Technology & Politics, Electoral Studies and Party Politics 
(Alvarez et al., 2014a; 2014b; Bressanelli, 2013; Bright et al., 2014; Dinas et al., 2014; Garzia et al., 
2014; Katsanidou and Lefkofridi, 2014; Rose and Borz, 2013; Sudulich et al., 2014; Trechsel and 
Mair, 2011). 
In occasion of the European Parliament elections of 2014, EUDO launched a new VAA: euandi 
(reads: EU and I). The academic relevance of the euandi endeavour lies primarily in its choice to stick 
to the party positioning methodology already employed by the EU Profiler in 2009 as well as in the 
choice to keep as many policy items as possible in the 2014 questionnaire in order to allow cross-
national, longitudinal research on party competition and voting behaviour in the EU across a five-year 
period.  
In the following sections of the paper, we present the euandi project in a nutshell, the making of the 
questionnaire and the way in which political parties have been coded. Then, we illustrate the 
functioning of the application and the specifics of the resulting user dataset, comprising the opinions 
of 400.000 unique users that completed the euandi questionnaire during the six weeks preceding the 
EP elections of 2014.  
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 Note that the euandi party dataset is already available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.12138  
The user dataset is expected to be made available to the research community in June 2015. 
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The euandi project in a nutshell 
euandi is the first “Social VAA” ever developed. Available in 24 languages, it invites users to react to 
28 policy statements covering a wide range of contemporary policy issues and political values in 
European politics, as well as to two policy statements specific to the user’s national political context. 
euandi provides voters with a clear view of the European electoral campaign and their individual 
positions within it. Not only does the tool help people identify which political parties represent their 
views, but it also provides an innovative platform for community building, where people from all over 
Europe can connect with each other based on their political views.  
Figure 1. The euandi homepage 
 
 
The euandi project was led by Professor Alexander H. Trechsel at the European University 
Institute (EUI) in Florence, Italy, in close collaboration with the Berkman Center for Internet and 
Society at Harvard University, directed by Professor Urs Gasser, and in cooperation with LUISS 
University, Rome. The technical partner involved in the development was RnD Lab, based in Milan, 
Italy. The project was overseen by an Executive Committee based at the EUI.
2
 An International 
Advisory Board consisting of more than 40 of the world’s leading political scientists in Europe and the 
United States was actively linked to the project.
3
 The backbone of the project was represented by its 
twenty-eight country teams, including 121 highly trained and knowledgeable social scientists at the 
doctoral or post-doctoral level researching and coding the political parties featured in the tool. The 
majority of country teams’ members are currently affiliated with the EUI, but several collaborators 
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 The euandi Executive Committee consisted of: Alexander H. Trechsel (project leader), Stephan 
Albrechtskirchinger (media and outreach coordinator), Valentina Bettin (administrative coordinator), Lorenzo De 
Sio (technological and scientific coordinator), Diego Garzia (country-teams and scientific coordinator), Urs Gasser (legal 
and policy coordinator), and Ingo Linsemann (financial manager). 
3
 The full list is available online at: http://www.eui.eu/Projects/EUDO/EUandI/InternationalAdvisoryBoard.aspx 
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were based in other parts of Europe.
4
 More than a quarter of the coding personnel could be considered 
expert coders insofar as they had already worked for the EU Profiler project back in 2009.  
During the six weeks preceding the EP elections, the euandi.eu website attracted over a million 
users across the EU. Its i-frame has been featured in the homepage of numerous national newspapers' 
websites including German Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Italian La Repubblica and La Stampa, 
Austrian Der Standard, Polish Gazeta Wyborcza, French Le Noubel Observateur, and Swedish 
Expressen amongst others. 
The euandi questionnaire 
It goes almost without saying that the quality of euandi – as in any other VAA endeavour, for that 
matters – depends first and foremost on the content and formulation of its statements (Walgrave et al., 
2009; Lefevere and Walgrave, 2014; Van Camp et al., 2014). This task was undertaken in close 
collaboration with the International Advisory Board of euandi. The first criterion was to look for 
statements that are politically relevant. Whether one likes Wagner more than Verdi cannot become a 
statement. However, whether same-sex marriage is a good idea or not is an excellent candidate for the 
tool (and it eventually became part of the 30 statements). It is a good statement as parties running in 
the campaign take up very different positions vis-à-vis the issue of same-sex marriage. And this is 
what we were looking for: statements on which there is disagreement between the parties. 
Furthermore, we wanted to cover the issues at stake in the European election campaign as broadly as 
possible. For this, we used the results of opinion polls, earlier party manifesto coding, experts, 
academics and journalists – we consulted many of these sources to find out what topics were important 
in these elections, what issues were hot, what areas of politics were going to become crucial in these 
elections. We tried nonetheless to maximize the amount of longitudinal data by choosing to keep 17 
out of the 28 common questions of the EU Profiler (basically, we only excluded statements when it 
became clear that they lost relevance in the course of the last EP legislature).
5
 For the remaining 11 
spots, we included highly salient topics (e.g., research on embryonic stem cells, personal privacy on 
the internet, Eurobonds). The resulting list of 28 common statements (see Table 1) encompasses a 
highly balanced set of political issues, grouped into nine areas covering a large proportion of 
contemporary democratic policy making and attitudes toward politics in the 28 EU member states. The 
detailed list of country-specific statements is provided in Appendix A.  
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 The full list is available online at: http://www.eui.eu/Projects/EUDO/EUandI/CountryTeams/Index.aspx 
5
 When compiling the final list of statements, we tried for as much as possible to take into account the findings from the 
emerging literature on content and formulation of VAA statements. On these grounds, we excluded two statements from 
the 2009 set (no. 4 and 18) in the light of the useful criticisms outlined by Gemenis (2013b). In spite of Van Camp et al.’s 
(2014) suggestion regarding double-barrelled statements, we decided to keep quite a few such items based on two major 
reasons – the most obvious one being longitudinal comparability. The second reason departs from Gemenis’ idea that 
presenting policy alternatives in terms of trade-offs is “a legitimate concern when asking about spending preferences” 
(Gemenis, 2013b: p. 272). We extended this logic to other domains such as environmental policies that – in absence of a 
clear trade-off (e.g., support of renewable energies can only come with increased energy costs, at least in the short-term) 
– would turn a given issue statement into a valence (and thus unsuitable) issue statement. Finally, the lack of concreteness 
on behalf of some of the statements represented the only way in which a common questionnaire of 28 statements could be 
fruitfully applied to as many as 28 different national political contexts. The loss in concreteness is widely compensated 
by the high generalizability that makes some of the statements (e.g., “Immigrants from outside Europe should be required 
to accept our culture and values”, “European integration is a good thing”) especially useful for comparative party 
research. 
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Table 1. The euandi questionnaire (common statements) 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Welfare, family and health 
1.  Social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes 
2.  It should be harder for EU immigrants working or staying in [your country] to get access to social 
assistance benefits than it is for [your country's] citizens 
3.  Pension benefits should be reduced to limit the state debt in [your country] 
 
Migration and immigration 
4.  To fight the problem of illegal immigration, the European Union should take responsibility for patrolling 
its borders  
5.  Immigration [into your country] should be made more restrictive 
6.  Immigrants from outside Europe should be required to accept our culture and values 
 
Society, religion and culture 
7.  The legalisation of same sex marriages is a good thing 
8.  Embryonic stem cell research should be stopped 
9.  The legalisation of the personal use of soft drugs is to be welcomed 
10.  Euthanasia should be legalised 
 
Finances and taxes 
11.  Government spending should be reduced in order to lower taxes 
12.  The EU should acquire its own tax raising powers 
13.  Bank and stock market gains should be taxed more heavily 
 
Economy and work 
14.  Governments should reduce workers' protection regulations in order to fight unemployment 
15.  The state should provide stronger financial support to unemployed workers 
16.  The EU should relax its austerity policy in order to foster economic growth 
 
Environment, transport and energy 
17.  The promotion of public transport should be fostered through green taxes (e.g. road taxing) 
18.  Renewable sources of energy (e.g. solar or wind energy) should be supported even if this means 
higher energy costs 
 
Law and order 
19.  Restrictions of personal privacy on the Internet should be accepted for public security reasons 
20.  Criminals should be punished more severely 
21.  Access to abortion should become more restricted 
 
Foreign policy 
22.  The European Union should strengthen its security and defence policy 
23.  On foreign policy issues the EU should speak with one voice 
 
European integration 
24.  European integration is a good thing 
25.  To tackle the sovereign debt crisis, the member states of the Eurozone should be allowed to issue 
common bonds (Eurobonds) 
26.  The single European currency (Euro) is a bad thing 
27.  Individual member states of the EU should have less veto power 
28.  Any new European Treaty should be subject to approval in a referendum in [your country] 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Items taken from the EU Profiler questionnaire are presented in bold. 
euandi. Project description and datasets documentation 
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In terms of dimensionality, the results of the factor analysis of parties’ positions presented in Table 2 
highlight that the large majority of items load onto three major factors corresponding to the economic 
left-right (Factor 1), the pro-anti EU continuum (Factor 2), and a progressive-conservative dimension 
(Factor 3). Interestingly, the items on immigration from outside the EU (no. 4 and 5) do not seem to 
group with any other factor, and so do environmental issues (no. 17 and 18). Only one item (no. 3 on 
limitation of pension benefits) does not appear to group with any of the other issues. 
Table 2. Factor analysis of euandi policy statements (party dataset) 
 
# Item (short description) Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
       
1 Maintain social programmes 0.75 0.06 0.32 -0.18 0.21 
2 Limit welfare for immigrants -0.33 -0.39 -0.39 0.39 -0.22 
3 Reduce pension benefits -0.16 0.11 0.07 -0.10 0.10 
4 EU should patrol borders -0.08 0.47 -0.07 0.66 0.02 
5 Restrictions to immigration -0.15 -0.35 -0.28 0.72 -0.22 
6 Acceptance of our values -0.39 0.03 -0.60 0.31 -0.24 
7 Same-sex marriages good 0.14 0.20 0.82 -0.19 0.16 
8 Stop stem cell research 0.06 -0.11 -0.88 0.00 -0.14 
9 Legalise soft drugs 0.56 -0.09 0.47 -0.10 0.07 
10 Legalise euthanasia 0.30 0.25 0.64 0.22 0.06 
11 Reduce gov’t spending -0.68 0.20 -0.20 0.23 -0.20 
12 EU tax-raising powers 0.52 0.54 0.34 0.08 0.07 
13 Tax stock market gains 0.81 0.02 -0.15 0.01 0.20 
14 Reduce workers' protection -0.75 0.02 -0.12 0.11 -0.05 
15 Increase support for unemployed 0.57 -0.03 0.25 -0.36 0.24 
16 Relax austerity policies 0.84 0.00 0.03 -0.05 0.12 
17 Promote public transport 0.22 0.11 0.25 -0.12 0.81 
18 Support renewable energies 0.28 -0.03 0.21 -0.13 0.81 
19 Accept privacy restrictions -0.37 0.17 -0.03 0.49 -0.27 
20 Punish criminals more severely -0.41 -0.20 -0.36 0.34 -0.18 
21 Restrict access to abortion -0.13 -0.37 -0.73 0.31 -0.13 
22 Strengthen EU defence policy -0.20 0.90 0.03 0.14 0.07 
23 One voice for EU foreign policy -0.12 0.90 0.08 0.07 0.05 
24 European integration is good 0.07 0.85 0.25 -0.18 0.06 
25 Introduce Eurobonds 0.65 0.39 0.41 -0.01 -0.11 
26 Euro is a bad thing -0.08 -0.88 -0.16 0.01 0.15 
27 Less veto power for member states 0.41 0.74 0.23 0.05 0.01 
28 Referendum for any new EU treaty 0.37 -0.54 -0.02 0.27 -0.16 
       
variance explained (%) 33.7 17.9 8.0 7.2 4.9 
              
 
Note: Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation.  
Entries in bold represent the largest coefficient in the respective row. 
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The iterative method of party positioning:  
When parties (also) position themselves 
Throughout the years, political scientists have devised a multitude of techniques to position political 
parties on various ideological and policy/issue dimensions. (for a comprehensive overview, see: 
Marks, 2007). So far, however, none of these techniques has been able to impose itself as the gold 
standard in party positioning endeavours (Pennings, 2011). Particularly troublesome, in this respect, is 
the still unsuccessful quest for a sound methodology to place political parties across countries and time 
(Mair, 2001).  
A frequently used methodology in the earliest works in the field takes as point of reference the 
perceptions of party positions that are held by party supporters. Both Klingemann and Inglehart (1976) 
and Sani and Sartori’s (1983) attempts to compare party systems in left-right terms were based on the 
self-placement of voters of the various parties under analysis. Evidently, what matters here is not the 
“real” position of the parties, but rather the way in which this position is perceived – and presumably 
acted upon – by their voters. 
A relatively more objective assessment would seem to be provided by elite surveys. Starting with 
Daalder and van der Geer’s (1973) analysis of Dutch parliamentary parties, the discipline has widely 
resorted to the expertise of political parties themselves. This methodology bears clear advantages vis-
à-vis voters’ self-placement, but it comes with problems too. For one thing, the very nature of political 
parties as non-unitary actors is likely to result in diverging estimates depending on whom is involved 
in the process of calibration (e.g., party leadership, campaign management, individual MPs). Strategic 
considerations might also hinder the validity and transparency of the estimates. For instance, large and 
established parties may have strong incentives to blur their position rather than clarifying it, 
particularly if currently in office (Krouwel and van Elfrinkhof, 2013). Results are also very much 
likely to be affected by the timing within the electoral cycle of the study. Especially during election 
campaigns, parties have strong incentives to alter their real positions by portraying them in the most 
appealing way for voters. As we shall see, the international literature on VAAs pullulates of many 
such examples (for a review, see: Garzia et al., 2014). 
For all these reasons, the discipline has moved away from the idea that party positions should be 
measured on the basis of internal party expertise, and moved towards academically-driven techniques, 
most notably expert surveys (Castles and Mair, 1984; Ray, 1999; Benoit and Laver 2006; Steenbergen 
and Marks, 2007; Hooghe et al., 2010; Bakker et al., 2015) and manifesto coding (Budge et al., 2001; 
Klingemann et al., 2006). In both cases, party positions are established by professionals outside the 
parties: qualified researchers in the case of expert surveys, expert coders in the case of manifesto 
studies. Both techniques bear advantages as well as drawbacks (Benoit and Laver, 2007). With respect 
to the former, the experts that are assigned the task of positioning parties are asked to do so in light of 
their demonstrable knowledge in the field, but they are not asked to justify their placings nor to cite 
evidence in support of their analytical choices. Consensus among experts is more easily achieved in 
the case of established, large and moderate parties vis-à-vis relatively newer, smaller or more extreme 
parties (Marks et al., 2007). A number of reasons make longitudinal analysis of party placements 
especially complicated, and in particular when researchers are asked at once to place parties in the 
present as well as in given point(s) in the past (Krouwel and van Elfrinkhof, 2013). This issue has been 
successfully addressed by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) series, where different sets of 
experts are asked to place political parties on a number of policy dimensions at intervals of four years. 
However, “[w]hile it is an advantage that expert surveys can be administered at any time, this does not 
impede the comparability of the results if the time points within election cycles across and within 
countries differ” (Krouwel and van Elfrinkhof, 2013: p. 1458) but it certainly decreases the cross-
national reliability of the estimates.  
Manifesto coding is apparently more transparent: the codes used are in fact attributed to publicly 
available party documents. Even in this case, however, it is not always straightforward (and at times 
euandi. Project description and datasets documentation 
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not possible) to trace the coder’s decision to employ a specific coding category to a concrete piece of 
text. The best-known cross-national endeavour in party positioning that makes use of this technique is 
the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). This, however, has not gone without critiques. To begin 
with, the whole CMP project is based on the doubtful assumption that position can be inferred through 
saliency – two parties placing the same amount of emphasis on a given issue will be automatically 
assigned the same position (Gemenis, 2013a). Moreover, inter-coder reliability has been shown to be 
very low (Benoit et al., 2009). The longitudinal character of this study (an asset, in itself) forces 
coders to use issue categories developed in the early waves of the study dating back to the 1970s that 
have become progressively irrelevant in the political competition. In other words, higher levels of 
miscoding are likely to be plaguing the most recent waves of the study (Krouwel and van Elfrinkhof, 
2013). Automated content analysis techniques such as Wordscores performs no better overall. 
According to Lowe (2008), it is unclear what assumptions the method makes about political text and 
how to tell whether they fit particular text analysis applications. More simply put, these analyses, 
albeit fully replicable and thus reliable, lose in validity insofar as words are just taken out of context.  
Most recently, a novel method of placing political parties has appeared, in connection with the 
spread of VAAs. As in the case of academic party placement, early VAAs have primarily resorted to 
elite surveys (e.g., Stemwijzer, Wahl-O-Mat) and to a lesser extent to large-n surveys of social and 
political scientists (e.g., Irish Pick Your Party, Italian Itanes VoteMatch) to gauge parties’ position on 
the various policy statements. Until recently, however, these techniques have been used in isolation 
with one to another, with the unfortunate consequence that parties have been able to “manipulate” 
their position in absence of an impartial check by expert observers (for the often quoted case of CDA 
in the Dutch election of 2006, see: van Praag, 2007; see also: Walgrave et al., 2008 for the case of 
Belgium, and Raimonaite, 2010 for the case of Lithuania). To avoid these drawbacks, an iterative 
method, consisting in a combination of expert judgement and party self-placement has been pioneered 
by the Dutch VAA Kieskompas (Krouwel et al., 2012), it has been exported in numerous countries in 
Europe and beyond in later years (for a review, see: Krouwel et al., 2014), and it has been then applied 
to a supranational (European) election with the EU Profiler in 2009 (Sudulich et al., 2014). The 
iterative method attempts to maximize the strengths of a combination of consolidated methodologies 
while at the same time trying to counterbalance the respective weaknesses. Expert coding and party 
self-placement take place independently, but the respective results are then compared in order to 
introduce a control mechanism. In the case of the EU Profiler, teams of experts and parties agreed on 
over 70 percent of the placements already at the first round. The further possibility to interact with the 
parties in the so-called “calibration” stage led the percentage of agreement between the parties and the 
team of coders to about 95% (Trechsel and Mair, 2011). The coding process itself goes beyond the 
exclusive reliance on the current election manifesto by encompassing a hierarchy of sources (e.g., 
statements by leading figures, party’s internet website, previous party manifestos, and so on) in order 
to reduce the likelihood that a party cannot be placed on a given policy statement. Moreover, all texts 
that are taken into account by the expert coders are made publicly available so that each coding choice 
can remain always verifiable.
6
 At the very same time, the inclusion of parties in the process reduces 
the bias inherent to expert-placing small and new parties, which are likely to know more about 
themselves than expert coders usually do (see above). As VAAs are always developed in proximity to 
elections, concerns about the bias induced by the timing within the electoral cycle (as it is the case 
with CHES and similar cross-national endeavours) are virtually set to zero. 
With more than 270 parties from across the entire EU coded simultaneously on as many as 30 
different policy statements in view of the 2009 EP elections, the EU Profiler project represented a 
breakthrough in cross-national party research (Trechsel and Mair, 2011). As a matter of fact none of 
the available expert and manifesto coding exercises carried out until then were checked with the many 
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 In this respect, the EU Profiler is considered "a best practice example as it allows users to see the exact statements (and 
their source) that have been used to code each party position" (Gemenis 2013b: p. 288). 
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parties involved in the development of the VAA. Indeed, a crucial – if not the crucial – issue involved 
in this methodology lies in the willingness of the parties to participate to the coding process. 103 
parties used the opportunity to position themselves in the EU Profiler, “a remarkably high 37.6 
percent response rate” (Trechsel and Mair, 2011: p. 13). As Gemenis and van Ham (2014) note 
correctly, “[w]ithout the full and unfettered cooperation of political parties, the...method cannot work 
as originally intended” (p. 36). Considering that the EU Profiler project represented “the first time that 
parties themselves have been involved in a cross-national effort to identify their policy positions”, 
Trechsel and Mair (2011) suggest that “more use might be made of their input in similar exercises in 
the future” (p. 13). 
In 2014, the task of making more use of parties’ input has been taken up by the euandi project, 
which was able to substantially increasing the proportion of political parties involved to levels so far 
never achieved by any cross-national party positioning endeavour. A number of reasons help 
explaining why more than a half of the 242 parties included in the VAA took part in the coding 
process: the increased relevance of VAAs in the electoral process in a growing number of European 
democracies (and therefore the familiarity with the method among parties), an increasing expertise 
among the research teams, the massive spread of (relatively cheap) internet-based technologies 
necessary to share large amounts of information (e.g., Surveymonkey) and to undertake multiple 
rounds of communication on a transnational scale (e.g., Skype). Several transnational VAAs have 
been offered to European voters during the 2014 campaign. However, only euandi offered voters the 
possibility to compare their political preferences with the positions estimated in collaboration with the 
political parties.
7
 Not only did euandi use the very same methodology for party placing successfully 
deployed in EU Profiler. In fact, the academic team of the project decided to replicate as many policy 
items as possible from the 2009 questionnaire in the 2014 edition of the VAA. In this way, we are now 
able to provide the political science community with an unique dataset featuring the policy positions 
of hundreds of political parties in two consecutive EP elections estimated in collaboration with the 
parties themselves. 
The euandi team tried to be as inclusive as possible and the exclusion of a party was only 
considered if a range of opinion polls strongly suggested that the party would not win a single seat in 
the election. Almost every party that currently had a seat in the European Parliament or national 
parliaments and that was polling to win at least one seat in the EP has been included.
8
 In the end, the 
parties included in the tool amounted to 242 (M=8.6 per country) which, multiplied by 30 statements, 
makes the number of individual codings available in the euandi dataset equal to 7260 (M=60 per 
coder). The full list of political parties included in the tool is presented in Appendix B. 
                                                     
7
 Among the major transnational VAAs for the 2014 EP elections, we note that MyVote2014.eu placed national parties 
based on the roll-call behavior of their respective MEPs, while the VoteMatch Europe consortium did not uniform the 
different methodologies employed by the single national partners, thus rendering their party placements virtually useless 
for comparative research. EU Vox pioneered the use of the Delphi method in a transnational VAA. The method has been 
proven to bear advantages vis-à-vis conventional expert surveys but no evidence would seem to point towards the idea 
that it is in anyway superior to the iterative method (see: Gemenis and van Ham, 2014). While increasing the level of 
consensus among the experts, it must be also noted that the Delphi method excludes from the process one of the key 
contributors to the quality of the data – the parties themselves. 
8
 After the launch of the VAA on April 16, 2014, a number of parties manifested their discontent with the project 
leadership's choice to exclude them. The Estonian Whistleblowersparty (in Estonian: Euroopa Vilepuhujate Partei) led 
by the Dutch citizen Joeri Wiersman did “blow the Whistle…in the interest of democracy and an independent and 
objective Vote advisory” (email communication with the euandi project leadership). In the light of their exclusion, 
Slovenian ZARES reported to the country team leadership their unhappiness with the “unsubstantial” replies received and 
informed of their intention to forward them to the Institute for Electronic Participation (INePA) for evaluation. 
Incidentally, the head of INePA happened to be also member of the Slovenian country team. It is worth noting that 
neither of these parties reached the minimum threshold of 1 percent that we considered the minimal requirement for 
targeting inclusion in the VAA. Indeed, only fourteen parties (six of which from Spain) that eventually gained a seat in 
the 8th EP Legislature have not been featured in euandi. 
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All these parties were given the opportunity to react to the 30 statements and provide their self-
placement. The euandi team prepared a message in the corresponding country’s language and 
contacted by email all the parties targeted for inclusion. The invitation email went off simultaneously 
on February 10, 2014. In the email, parties were invited to fill in an online SurveyMonkey 
questionnaire, motivating their choices by supplying supporting material. Information on the name of 
the person filling out the survey, the person’s position in the party and his/her contact details were also 
sought. The initial deadline given to the parties to complete the survey was March 10. In many cases, 
however, an extension was sought by those parties whose EP election programme had not yet been 
released. Eventually, the deadline was extended to April 1. Whenever a party carried out its own self-
placement and documented its positions thoroughly and convincingly, its coding became final. In 
parallel, the country teams proceeded to code parties’ positions. Our experts were asked to specify 
what documentation they had used in order to place parties. They were invited to use eight types of 
sources hierarchically ordered – the top being the party’s own EP election manifesto. In instances 
where the party has not printed any opinion, the researchers referred to other party manifestos, party 
websites, statements in the media and other secondary sources. As coding reliability depends to a 
substantial extent on the type of documents used (Gemenis, 2013a) we note that the majority of party 
positions coded in euandi are based on the “best” sources: the EU election manifesto 2014 of the 
national party, the party election platform, the current/latest national election manifesto, and other 
programmatic and official party documentation (see Table 3). When such sources were not available, a 
major source of information was represented by recent interviews and media coverage (17 percent of 
the total). Only upon necessity, our coders resorted to actions and statements of members of 
parliament and government (10 percent) and to various other sources from before 2013 (4 percent). 
Table 3. Hierarchy of data sources 
 
       %             N 
    
i. EU Election Manifesto 2014 of national party 14 (1051) 
ii. Party Election Platform 10.8 (815) 
iii. Current/latest national election manifesto 16.6 (1244) 
iv. EU Election Manifesto 2014 of Europarties 3.2 (238) 
v. Other programmatic and official party documentation 16.9 (1272) 
vi. Actions/statements of party representatives in government and parliament 9.5 (715) 
vii. Interviews and other coverage in media outlets in 2013-2014 13.0 (979) 
viii. Older Election Manifestos, party documentation, statements and interviews 4.4 (334) 
ix. Other 11.5 (868) 
 Total 100 (7516) 
        
 
Note: Total N exceeds 7260 because coders could use multiple sources when coding a party on a given 
statement. In case of parties coded “no opinion” on a given statement (N=1137) no source was provided. 
When the party self-placement and the expert coding were completed, the two results were compared 
during the so-called calibration stage. Where there were discrepancies, the party was asked to provide 
more support for its declared position, and a final answer was identified. Where parties declined the 
invitation, country teams took care of positioning the parties based on the available documentation. 
The results of the expert coding were then submitted to all parties, independently of them having 
previously cooperated with euandi or not. Parties were offered the choice to engage once more with 
the country team in case of disagreements. One third of the parties who already took part in the self-
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placement exercise took advantage of this further possibility. A number of parties (i.e., 5 percent of the 
total) not previously involved in the self-placement engaged with the country team only at the 
calibration stage (see Table 4). 
Table 4. Degrees of cooperation 
  % N 
Parties who took part in self-placement and calibration stages 17 (41) 
Parties who took part only in the self-placement stage 33 (80) 
Parties who took part only in the calibration stage 5 (12) 
 
Parties who did not cooperate at all 45 (109) 
   
Total 
 
100 
 
(242) 
 
More than a hundred parties simply ignored our repeated attempts to get in contact with them. In a 
very few instances, parties actively self-excluded themselves on different grounds.
9
 Nevertheless, the 
majority of political parties targeted for inclusion in the tool accepted to take part in either the self-
placement and/or the calibration stages, thanks also to the sustained efforts brought about by the 
euandi country teams. Overall, 55 percent of all the parties contacted by the euandi team engaged in 
this cooperative endeavour.  
Admittedly, the road has been long and, at times, winding. Several parties asked (without success) 
for changes in the question wording, while a number of others insisted on the request to be coded 
separately from other partners in their respective electoral alliances.
10
 Some parties openly disagreed 
with our coding methodology and argued that, if any, they are the ones to know their position best. 
Our country teams tried to persuade the parties of our willingness to accept their opinions only as long 
as these opinions could be documented on the basis of publicly available information. While in most 
cases our country team leaders could settle down the issue, some parties threatened (again, without 
success) to “withdraw” from euandi, as it was the case with Danish liberal party Venstre. The Greek 
party Dimiourgia Xana! even threatened the project leadership with taking up legal actions in case 
euandi did not comply with their self-placement straight away. Except for these few examples, 
however, the largest part of the endeavour took place in a collaborative way. Some parties even came 
to change their position after interaction with the country teams, who argued convincingly (based on 
the party’s documents) in favour of their original coding choices (e.g., Czech Piràti). In other 
instances, our coders found themselves in the position of igniting a process of deliberation within the 
parties that led them to turn a non-attitude into an actual policy position. Finland’s Pirate Party, for 
instance, launched a web-survey among its EP candidates to identify a unitary party position in 
response to our self-placement questionnaire. In Slovenia, Solidarnost even admitted they had not 
taken a position on certain questions yet, and asked its self-positioning to be taken as indicative of 
their positions. The country team agreed to the party drawing up a list of newly taken positions and to 
the party sending in an official document that could be quoted. The Croatian Nacionalni Forum – a 
new party formed only in early 2014 – stated that our expert coding, based on the few public 
documents the team could find, would misrepresent them since they had opinions about all the 
                                                     
9
 It is worth noting the explanation provided by the electoral alliance of the two Christian Dutch parties, Christen Unie and 
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, who declined our invitation to the self-placement as they did not see the point of 
another VAA being offered to Dutch voters. 
10
 For instance, Croatia’s Nacionalni Forum, part of an electoral cartel with the social-liberal party HSLS, forcefully asked 
not to be coded as a coalition. As they argued, their electoral alliance was to be considered a one-time coalition among 
partners that have few common ideas and prospects of working together in the future. 
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statements, bus simply did not have the chance to express them so far. Also in this case, the country 
team accepted that the party could answer all the statements, together with a relatively elaborate 
explanation of their stances. The party also agreed that their complete answers to the euandi survey 
would have been made available on the party’s website. 
Table 5 presents a longitudinal analysis of response rates by country and year (data relative to 2009 
is referred to the EU Profiler project). If one looks separately at the top and the bottom panel of the 
table, relative to Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) respectively, it can be 
observed that already in 2009 half of the Western parties took part in the process. In the East, this 
figure was not even half as high (23 percent). In 2014, both sides of the Union have increased their 
figures. Yet, while the percentage increase is “only” 11 percent in the case of Western countries, the 
figure gets more than doubled in CEE countries. Among individual countries, we single out Austria as 
the only country in which all parties took part in the 2014 coding, a tribute in particular to the efforts 
of the Austrian team leader, Zoe Lefkofridi. Very high cooperation rates are also reported in Sweden 
and the Benelux countries – the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The latter also scores among 
those countries with the highest proportional growth in terms of participation (+50 percent) together 
with Ireland and Italy. In CEE, the most cooperating country is Estonia, where 6 out of 7 parties (85.7 
percent) cooperated. Hungarian and Slovenian teams have also been able to involve over two thirds of 
the targeted parties in the process. The best proportional increase, however, comes from Lithuania, 
where not a single party cooperated in 2009. In 2014, more than half of Lithuanian parties took part in 
the coding. Romania remains the only country featuring the participation of no party whatsoever in 
either project.  
Overall, euandi increased the figures of EU Profiler up to 55 percent. Never before a transnational 
party positioning exercise coded so many parties (242, and on as many as 30 issue statements) in 
collaboration with the majority of the parties involved. 
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Table 5. Cooperation rates across EU countries, 2009-2014 
  2009   2014   % 
  % N   % N   DIFF. 
        
Austria 66.7% (6)  100.0% (6)  +33.3% 
Belgium 76.9% (13)  91.7% (12)  +14.8% 
Cyprus 100.0% (6)  62.5% (8)  –37.5% 
Denmark 66.7% (9)  50.0% (8)  –16.7% 
Finland 83.3% (12)  70.0% (10)  –13.3% 
France 12.5% (16)  30.0% (10)  +17.5% 
Germany 50.0% (10)  61.5% (13)  +11.5% 
Greece 42.9% (7)  33.3% (12)  –9.6% 
Ireland 14.3% (7)  66.7% (6)  +52.4% 
Italy 12.5% (8)  63.6% (11)  +51.1% 
Luxemburg 37.5% (8)  87.5% (8)  +50.0% 
Malta 50.0% (4)  33.3% (3)  –16.7% 
Netherlands 81.8% (11)  91.7% (12)  +9.9% 
Portugal 8.3% (12)  12.5% (8)  +4.2% 
Spain 63.6% (11)  75.0% (4)  +11.4% 
Sweden 72.7% (11)  90.0% (10)  +17.3% 
United Kingdom 8.3% (24)  23.1% (13)  +14.8% 
Total West 49.9% (175)   61.3% (154)   +11.4% 
        
Bulgaria 37.5% (8)  25.0% (8)  –12.5% 
Croatia 14.3% (7)  57.1% (7)  +42.8% 
Czech Republic 22.2% (9)  50.0% (10)  +27.8% 
Estonia 50.0% (8)  85.7% (7)  +35.7% 
Hungary 66.7% (6)  83.3% (6)  +16.6% 
Latvia 0% (9)  14.3% (7)  +14.3% 
Lithuania 0% (9)  57.1% (7)  +57.1% 
Poland 22.2% (9)  37.5% (8)  +15.3% 
Romania 0% (5)  0% (9)  - 
Slovakia 0% (6)  30.0% (10)  +30.0% 
Slovenia 44.4% (9)  66.7% (9)  +22.3% 
Total CEE 23.4% (85)   46.1% (88)   +22.7% 
        
TOTAL EU28 39.5% (260)  55.0% (242)  +15.5% 
 
Note: Data for 2009 comes from: Trechsel and Mair, 2011. 
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In 2014, not even the EP family of the party could discriminate substantially in terms of participation 
(see Table 6). Whereas in 2009 only the parties belonging to the Greens/EFA group reported 
participation figures above 50 percent, this time virtually all major groups (i.e., ALDE, EPP, 
Greens/EFA, GUE/NGL, S&D) scored above that threshold. 
Table 6. Cooperation rates across EP party groups, 2009-2014 
 
  2009   2014   % 
  % N   % N   DIFF. 
        
ALDE 39.4% (33)  68.8% (32)  +29.4% 
ECR - -  35.0% (20)  - 
EFDD - -  18.2% (11)  - 
EPP 24.1% (58)  48.9% (45)  +24.8% 
Greens/EFA 65.5% (29)  66.7% (33)  +1.2% 
GUE/NGL 22.2% (27)  65.2% (23)  +43.0% 
S&D (PES in 2009) 34.2% (38)  58.8% (34)  +24.6% 
All Others 46.7% (75)  52.3% (44)  +9.6% 
                
 
Note: Data for 2009 comes from: Trechsel and Mair, 2011. 
The complete irrelevance of the East/West divide as well as the belonging to a specific party family is 
more rigorously shown by the results of a logistic regression where the dependent variable measures 
whether a party agreed to participate in the coding (see Table 7). The inclusion of further party-level 
variables such as their electoral size or their government/opposition status does not increase in a 
statistically significant way our ability to predict if a party decided to take part in the coding. Indeed, 
the key finding comes from VAA-related variables. Clearly, parties operating in political systems 
where VAAs have nowadays turned into a major campaign player are more likely to take part in the 
coding effort.
11
 This finding generates further encouragement for future coding efforts in this 
direction, in the light of the ongoing spread of VAAs across Europe. We find that also coders’ skills 
do make a difference. Country teams involving expert coders were statistically more likely to involve 
a higher number of parties in the coding process.
12
 Note that no statistically significant correlation [r=-
.03, p=.68] exists between the number of experienced coders in a team and the familiarity with VAAs 
in the respective country. Good coders do not need to come necessarily from VAA countries. 
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 For illustrative purposes, a given country’s familiarity with VAAs is rather crudely measured by a dummy that codes “1” 
all parties in those countries where Masrchall (2014) witnessed the existence of a VAA capable of reaching at least 10 
percent of the eligible voting population in the country, and “0” all other parties. The countries thus considered familiar 
with VAAs are: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands.  
12
 Expertise of the team is measured through a numeric value shared by each party in a given country and equal to the 
number of coders in the respective country team who also worked for the EU Profiler in 2009 (31 coders in total, an 
average of 1.29 per team with standard deviation of 1). 
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Table 7. The determinants of cooperation. Logistic regression analysis  
 
      
West/East -.21 (.32) 
Party Size (EP 2014) -.01 (.02) 
In Government -.23 (.37) 
   
EP Party Family (Ref. Category: Non-Inscrits)   
 ALDE .56 (.54) 
 ECR -.83 (.62) 
 EFDD -1.71 (.93) 
 EPP -.02 (.50) 
 Greens/EFA .54 (.52) 
 GUE/NGL .46 (.57) 
 S&D .43 (.54) 
   
# of Expert Coders in the Team .51 (.15)** 
Country's familiarity with VAAs 1.64 (.40)*** 
   
Constant -.74 (.42) 
   
Nagelkerke’s Pseudo R-squared .25 
N 242 
      
 
Note: Table entries are binary logistic regression b coefficient estimates (standard error in parentheses) 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01 
The user experience 
After selecting in which country they wanted the comparison to take place and the app's language (in 
every instance, English was available next to the country's official language/languages) users could 
react to the 30 issue statements included in the tool by stating their level of agreement on a standard 
five-point scale ranging from ‘completely agree’ to ‘completely disagree’ plus a ‘no opinion’ option 
(see Figure 2).  
  
euandi. Project description and datasets documentation 
15 
Figure 2. Example of a euandi statement 
 
After reacting to the thirty statements, users were also allowed to mark in turn the issues they deemed 
"most important" and "least important" to them (see Figure 3). This information is then taken into 
account by the calculation algorithm (see below) in order to give greater emphasis to the positions 
weighted by the user as being "most important", and less emphasis to those weighted as "least 
important". Before being presented with the results, users were also asked about the probability that 
they will ever vote for each of the national parties included in the tool (i.e., standard PTV question on 
a 0-10 scale, ranging from "not at all probable" to "very probable") as well as their basic socio-
demographic characteristics (i.e., age category, gender, and level of education). Note that none of 
these information were taken into account during the calculation of the result, and users could skip 
these questions at any time (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 3. Assigning saliency to the issue statements 
 
Figure 4. Users' propensity to vote for (national) parties 
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The euandi algorithm then calculates the degree of proximity or match (in percentage points) between 
the answers provided by the user and the position of all parties included in the application. The full 
calculation procedure is presented in Appendix C. The user’s political profile can be examined in 
relation to the political parties of a given nation as well as with parties from the entire European Union 
(see Figure 5). 
Figure 5a. "Party Matching" visualization: National parties 
 
Figure 5b. "Party Matching" visualization: Parties in the EU 
 
One of the most technologically innovative features of euandi is the possibility for users to explore in 
interactive fashion the "political space" of each EU member state as well as their positioning within it 
(see Figure 6). This three-dimensional space is structured around the major dimensions of political 
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competition in Europe: economic left-right continuum, pro-anti EU integration continuum, and 
traditional-liberal continuum.
13
  
Figure 6. "My Political Space" visualization 
 
Next to the "vertical" matching functions, euandi also provided users with the possibility to engage in 
"horizontal" matching. Indeed, one of the most revolutionary features of euandi lies in the opportunity 
for people to match their views not only with those of the parties, but also with those of fellow users 
on a local, regional, national and even European level. In the "My Political Europe" interactive map, 
euandi compares the user’s position with those of other users and displays a map showing where other 
like-minded euandi users are located (see Figure 7). Shades of color of each geographical area 
(Eurostat NUTS-3 areas are used) are based on an “accordance index” varying from 0% to 100%, 
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 This visual representation is based on the assumption that, in most political systems, citizens’ and political parties’ 
opinions on individual issues can be aggregated to a limited number of issue dimensions. In the graphical representation 
offered to the user, the position of parties (and of the user) on each axis is the average of all positions across issues 
pertaining to each dimension. The computation of such averages, on each of the three axes, depends on a priori 
considerations, both in terms of which dimension an issue belongs to, and which side of the dimension a specific issue 
positions belongs to. More details on this procedure are available online at: http://euandi.eu/abouteuandi.html 
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which expresses the percentage of euandi users in that area that have political attitudes similar to the 
user.
14
  
Figure 7. "My Political Europe" visualization 
 
Respondents also may use Facebook to connect individually to other respondents with similar political 
preferences through the "User Matching" function. This visualization replicates the “Party Matching” 
visualization, allowing the user to see matching users, rather than parties. The calculation method is 
exactly the same applied for party matching.  
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 The calculation of such an “accordance index” is strictly related to the “My Political Space” three-dimensional 
visualization, as it relies on the same three dimensions used for that visualization. More details on this procedure are 
available online at: http://euandi.eu/abouteuandi.html 
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Figure 8. "User Matching" visualization 
  
Figure 9. The "euandi Communities" 
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Through FB login, users are also able to create or join online "euandi Communities" of similar 
political contours based on the euandi statements (see Figure 9). The “euandi community” 
visualization replicates the “Party matching” and the “User matching” visualizations, allowing the user 
to see matching euandi communities, rather than parties or users. The calculation method is exactly the 
same applied for party as well as user matching.
15
  
The user dataset 
During the six weeks before the election – that is, between April 16, when the website was launched, 
and May 25, when polling stations in all EU countries closed down – the euandi website attracted 
1.186.744 users (see Figure 10).  
Figure 10. Number of website visits per day, 16 April-25 May 2014 
 
We decided to include in the user dataset only those users who completed the entire questionnaire. In 
order to avoid duplicates (i.e., same users filling the questionnaire several times), the dataset only 
includes the answers provided to the first questionnaire by each user. The total amount of entries in the 
euandi user dataset corresponds to 399.882 unique user sessions. The number of completed profiles 
(by country) is presented in Table 8. Note that all entries in the dataset are geo-located at the 
provincial (NUTS-3) level. 
  
                                                     
15
 Note that the position of each community is always the position of its founder and not the average of its members. 
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Table 8. Number of completed profiles (by country) 
 
     
Austria 5.186 
 
Latvia 153 
Belgium 25.579 
 
Lithuania 213 
Bulgaria 8.188 
 
Luxembourg 2.097 
Croatia 251 
 
Malta 577 
Cyprus 155 
 
Netherlands 10.930 
Czech Republic 4.530 
 
Poland 18.302 
Denmark 617 
 
Portugal 8470 
Estonia 9.641 
 
Romania 667 
Finland 671 
 
Slovakia 335 
France 44.433 
 
Slovenia 1.464 
Germany 39.744 
 
Spain 6.536 
Greece 9769 
 
Sweden 19.515 
Hungary 622 
 
United Kingdom 7.247 
Ireland 2.742 
   Italy 159.242 
 
Extra-EU 12.006 
     
 
Note: Figures report the geographical location of users, not the country they chose to examine. 
In terms of socio-demographic characteristics, young, male and highly educated users are over-
represented in the euandi user dataset (see Figures 11 and 12). Male users are especially over-
represented in the sample, as they outnumber female users by an almost 2.5:1 factor (male users: 69.7 
percent; female users: 30.3 percent). 
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Figure 11. Users’ socio-demographic characteristics: Age category 
 
Figure 12. Users’ socio-demographic characteristics: Level of education 
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The dataset includes the opinions of all users on the 30 issue statements (on a 5-point scale ranging 
from completely disagree to completely agree, plus a no opinion option) as well as the degree of 
importance they attributed to each of the statements individually (i.e., least important, equally 
important, most important). Tables 9 and 10 presents the descriptive statistics for issue positions and 
saliency respectively. 
Table 9. Users’ position on the issue statements: Descriptive analysis 
# Item (short description) 
Completely 
Disagree 
Tend to 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Tend to 
Agree 
Completely 
Agree 
No 
Opinion 
        
1 Maintain social programmes 11.2% 19.9% 11.2% 37.6% 19.1% 1.15% 
2 Limit welfare for immigrants 32.2 25.7 9.2 18.0 14.1 0.8 
3 Reduce pension benefits 46.6 32.5 8.2 8.4 3.2 1.0 
4 EU should patrol borders 7.1 9.0 8.6 32.1 41.7 1.4 
5 Restrictions to immigration 15.4 22.7 14.6 22.3 23.9 1.1 
6 Acceptance of our values 13.1 16.6 12.6 26.9 30.2 0.7 
7 Same-sex marriages good 13.7 7.8 14.2 18.7 45.0 0.7 
8 Stop stem cell research 40.7 26.6 17.8 6.4 5.6 2.9 
9 Legalise soft drugs 18.4 15.2 13.6 25.5 26.5 0.8 
10 Legalise euthanasia 8.7 7.7 13.2 33.9 35.2 1.3 
11 Reduce gov’t spending 6.6 14.5 11.0 32.1 34.8 1.0 
12 EU tax-raising powers 22.3 18.9 18.3 24.1 12.5 3.9 
13 Tax stock market gains 6.1 9.6 10.5 30.7 41.4 1.8 
14 Reduce workers' protection 29.3 31.9 11.8 17.7 7.6 1.6 
15 Increase support for unemployed 9.8 23.6 18.1 28.8 19.0 0.8 
16 Relax austerity policies 5.3 12.2 14.6 34.6 30.2 3.0 
17 Promote public transport 13.7 20.3 14.4 31.6 18.4 1.6 
18 Support renewable energies 9.3 15.1 12.4 37.9 24.4 0.8 
19 Accept privacy restrictions 29.7 25.4 12.6 20.8 10.1 1.5 
20 Punish criminals more severely 4.4 10.8 16.9 27.5 39.1 1.3 
21 Restrict access to abortion 47.2 24.9 12.0 8.2 6.84 1.0 
22 Strengthen EU defence policy 9.2 15.6 21.0 30.2 22.1 1.9 
23 One voice for EU foreign policy 6.2 10.0 12.0 34.9 35.0 2.0 
24 European integration is good 6.0 7.4 14.1 33.1 37.4 1.9 
25 Introduce Eurobonds 8.7 8.5 24.2 29.5 19.3 9.9 
26 Euro is a bad thing 36.7 27.0 12.8 11.6 10.6 1.3 
27 Less veto power for member states 10.2 17.8 20.1 31.3 16.3 4.3 
28 Referendum for any new EU treaty 11.1 23.0 14.1 26.3 23.3 2.2 
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Table 10. Users’ stated importance of issue statements: Descriptive analysis 
# Item (short description) 
Most 
Important 
Issue 
Default 
Importance 
Least  
Important  
Issue 
     
1 Maintain social programmes 43.4 % 54.8 % 1.8 % 
2 Limit welfare for immigrants 15.0 80.1 4.9 
3 Reduce pension benefits 23.8 73.8 2.4 
4 EU should patrol borders 17.1 76.0 6.9 
5 Restrictions to immigration 23.8 71.9 4.3 
6 Acceptance of our values 15.7 70.4 13.8 
7 Same-sex marriages good 16.3 63.3 20.4 
8 Stop stem cell research 11.3 78.9 9.8 
9 Legalise soft drugs 12.6 65.8 21.6 
10 Legalise euthanasia 13.7 76.2 10.1 
11 Reduce gov’t spending 29.9 68.6 1.5 
12 EU tax-raising powers 8.9 86.2 4.9 
13 Tax stock market gains 23.0 72.9 4.2 
14 Reduce workers' protection 26.8 71.4 1.8 
15 Increase support for unemployed 20.7 76.5 2.8 
16 Relax austerity policies 18.0 79.2 2.8 
17 Promote public transport 16.2 75.0 8.8 
18 Support renewable energies 31.5 64.1 4.4 
19 Accept privacy restrictions 12.8 77.3 9.9 
20 Punish criminals more severely 23.7 71.2 5.1 
21 Restrict access to abortion 11.9 75.5 12.6 
22 Strengthen EU defence policy 13.1 78.0 8.8 
23 One voice for EU foreign policy 20.5 76.0 3.5 
24 European integration is good 23.3 73.2 3.5 
25 Introduce Eurobonds 12.5 78.8 8.7 
26 Euro is a bad thing 21.4 74.4 4.3 
27 Less veto power for member states 8.4 84.0 7.5 
28 Referendum for any new EU treaty 12.6 78.7 8.7 
          
Finally, the dataset also includes users’ stated propensity to vote for each of the parties contesting the 
election in the country of choice (on a 0 to 10 scale) as well as the percentage of match between the 
user and all the 242 parties included in euandi. Variable coding for the entire dataset is presented in 
Appendix D. 
Concluding remarks 
As repeatedly argued, the scientific relevance of the euandi project lies above all in the choice to stick 
to the iterative method of party positioning already employed in the EU Profiler project as well as in 
the choice to keep as many as seventeen policy items in the 2014 questionnaire in order to allow for 
cross-national, longitudinal research on party competition and electoral behaviour in the European 
Union member states. 
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We have reasons to believe that the use of the iterative method in connection with the recent VAA 
development represents a promising way for studying party positions across time and space. As said, 
degrees of cooperation on behalf of parties are increasingly high in the light of the growing relevance 
of VAAs in the electoral process. Users' electoral behaviour was affected by VAAs, as shown by 
several studies (see Alvarez et al., 2014; Walgrave et al., 2008) and parties appear to be progressively 
more aware of it. More systematic interactions between parties and increasingly skilled teams of VAA 
developers – whose interest is to produce the best application possible in an ever more crowded VAA 
market – permits to envisage ever more accurate datasets on party positions. The possibilities of the 
iterative method for party positioning will unfold at their maximum in conjunction with the making of 
further transnational VAAs willing to value the replication of issue statements across time. 
In terms of potential applications, VAA-generated data represents a fantastic source to conduct 
research on party competition and political representation. Traditional analyses of mass-elite 
congruence commonly resorted to traditional survey designs. In this respect, VAAs would seem to 
feature a number of advantages. As a matter of fact, VAAs able to attract millions of respondents 
during an election campaign and, even more importantly, they allow comparisons of the issue 
positions of voters and parties using the same data source. As a result, measurement of the extent to 
which parties and voters are mutually congruent will be strongly facilitated. The rise of supranational 
VAAs will also allow researchers to develop and test empirically-driven theories of party competition 
across levels of governance, as well as to dig deeper into the dynamics of multi-level representation 
and, ultimately, to empirically assess the opportunities and pitfalls stemming from the construction of 
a truly transnational voting space (Bright et al., 2014) in the EU and beyond.  
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Appendix A 
Country-specific statements 
Austria 
29. Comprehensive schools (a common education for all youth aged 11-14 should be established 
across Austria. 
30. Austria should introduce a property tax for millionaires 
Belgium-Flanders 
29. The income tax rate for high incomes should be increased 
30. Belgium's state structure should be changed into a confederation 
Belgium-Wallonia 
29. European and national elections should not be held simultaneously anymore 
30. In Belgium, financial solidarity between poorer and richer regions should remain guaranteed 
Bulgaria 
29. The current protests are purely partisan motivated and should stop immediately 
30. Bulgaria should continue to support the South Stream project, even if this undermines its relations 
with Brussels 
Croatia 
29. Granting the concessions for highways is a good strategy for improving the state of public finances 
30. The financing of the Catholic Church should be separated from the state budget 
Cyprus 
29. In order to tackle the economic crisis, Cyprus should fully implement all terms and conditions of 
the bailout agreement 
30. To remain in the Eurozone, Cyprus should radically reform the size and structure of its banking 
sector 
Czech Republic 
29. The common EU currency Euro should be introduced in the Czech Republic 
30. The European Union should be enlarged to include Turkey 
Denmark 
29. In order to maintain its level of welfare, Denmark should leave the European Union 
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30. Denmark should re-introduce border controls, even if this goes against the Schengen agreement 
Estonia 
29. Estonia should leave the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
30. The European Union and Russia should agree on visa freedom 
Finland 
29. Finland should have an important role in the EU's civilian crisis management operations 
30. Finland should support countries that have been most affected by the economic crisis 
France 
29. In order to fight unemployment and social inequality, economic globalisation should be limited 
30. France should contribute to the economic rescue of other member states 
Germany 
29. Germany should introduce data retention 
30. Germany should introduce a highway toll for foreigners 
Greece 
29. In order to tackle the economic crisis, Greece should fully implement all terms and conditions of 
the bailout agreement 
30. The size of the public sector should be reduced through lay-offs 
Hungary 
29. It should become more difficult for foreigners to buy land in Hungary 
30. Hungary's flat-rate personal income tax scheme should not be changed 
Ireland 
29. To improve the state of public finances, public sector employees should earn less 
30. Corporate taxes should be more standardized across the European Union 
Italy 
29. Illegal immigration should be punished more severely 
30. Italy should abolish all forms of public party financing 
Latvia 
29. It should become more difficult for foreigners to buy land in Latvia 
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30. The EU should recognize and condemn the role played by the communist regime in Central and 
Eastern Europe 
Lithuania 
29. The government should maintain and defend the use of Lithuanian in the public sphere 
30. The common EU currency Euro should be introduced in Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
29. In tax matters, Luxembourg should adopt the automatic exchange of information with EU 
countries on all forms of income (interest, capital gains, dividends, etc.). 
30. The separation of European and National elections should be maintained 
Malta 
29. Malta should be free to adopt a policy of sending migrants back to country of origin (pushback) 
30. The sale of Maltese citizenship should be promoted 
Netherlands 
29. The Netherlands should reintroduce residence and working permit restrictions for Bulgarian and 
Romanian citizens 
30. There should be a mandatory minimum wage for workers from other EU Member States that do 
temporary work in the Netherlands 
Poland 
29. The common EU currency Euro should be introduced in Poland 
30. Poland is not spending its European funds the right way 
Portugal 
29. Portugal should renegotiate its public debt in order to overcome the present economic crisis 
30. Portugal should leave the common EU currency Euro 
Romania 
29. Romania should be free to combat high-level corruption without monitoring from supranational 
political entities, such as the European Commission 
30. The current Constitutional reform project should be pursued in order to improve the functioning of 
the Romanian institutions 
Slovakia 
29. Slovakia should spend less of its European funds on the Roma minority 
30. Nuclear energy should remain in the sole competence of the member states of the EU 
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Slovenia 
29. State-owned companies should be privatized as widely as possible 
30. Elected politicians should step down when facing criminal investigations, until their name is 
cleared 
Spain 
29. When paying for a morgage becomes impossible, the rendition of the house should cancel the debt 
with the bank 
30. Autonomous Communities should be granted the right to become independent states 
Sweden 
29. Distribution of profit should not be allowed within tax-financed health care, education, and elderly 
care 
30. Responsibility for Swedish elementary and secondary schools should be transferred from the 
municipalities to the state 
United Kingdom 
England 
29. The UK should hold a referendum to decide whether to continue its membership of the European 
Union 
30. The government should require energy companies to fix prices for the next two years 
Northern Ireland 
29. The UK should hold a referendum to decide whether to continue its membership of the European 
Union 
30. Northern Ireland should become part of the Irish Republic 
Scotland 
29. The UK should hold a referendum to decide whether to continue its membership of the European 
Union 
30. Scotland should leave the United Kingdom and become an independent state 
Wales 
29. The UK should hold a referendum to decide whether to continue its membership of the European 
Union 
30. The Welsh Assembly should do more to promote the use of Welsh in everyday life 
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Appendix B 
Full list of political parties included in euandi 
 
Country (Acronym) Party Acronym Party Denomination 
Austria (AT) BZO Bündnis Zukunft Österreichs 
Austria (AT) FPO Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs 
Austria (AT) GRUNEN Die Grünen 
Austria (AT) NEOS das Neue Österreich 
Austria (AT) OVP Österreichische Volkspartei 
Austria (AT) SPO Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs 
 
Bulgaria (BG) ABV Alternative for Bulgarian Renaissance 
Bulgaria (BG) BBC Bulgaria without Censorship 
Bulgaria (BG) BSP Bulgarian Socialist Party 
Bulgaria (BG) DPS Movement for Rights and Freedom  
Bulgaria (BG) GERB Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria 
Bulgaria (BG) NFSB National Front for the salvation of Bulgaria  
Bulgaria (BG) RB Reformatorski Blok 
Bulgaria (BG) АТАКА Attack 
 
Croatia (HR) HDZ Koalicija HDZ-HSS-HSPAS 
Croatia (HR) HL Hrvatski laburisti - Stranka rada 
Croatia (HR) HSLS Hrvatska socijalno liberalna stranka  
Croatia (HR) KUKURIKU  KUKURIKU  
Croatia (HR) NF Nacionalni Forum 
Croatia (HR) ORAH Odrzivi razvoj Hrvatske 
Croatia (HR) SZH Savez za Hrvatsku 
 
Cyprus (CY) AKEL Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού 
Cyprus (CY) DIKO Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα 
Cyprus (CY) DISY Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός 
Cyprus (CY) EDEK Κίνημα Σοσιαλδημοκρατών ΕΔΕΚ 
Cyprus (CY) ELAM Εθνικό Λαϊκό Μέτωπο 
Cyprus (CY) EVROKO Ευρωπαϊκό Κόμμα 
Cyprus (CY) KOP Κίνημα Οικολόγων Περιβαλλοντιστών 
Cyprus (CY) SYPO Συμμαχία Πολιτών - Γιώργος Λιλλήκας 
 
Czech Rep. (CZ) ANO ANO 2011 
Czech Rep. (CZ) CSSD Česká strana sociálně demokratická 
Czech Rep. (CZ) KDUCSL KDU-CSL 
Czech Rep. (CZ) KSCM Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy 
Czech Rep. (CZ) LEV21 Národní socialisté – levice 21. století 
Czech Rep. (CZ) ODS Občanská demokratická strana 
Czech Rep. (CZ) PIRATI Česká pirátská strana 
Czech Rep. (CZ) SZH Strana zelených 
Czech Rep. (CZ) TOP09 Tradice Odpovědnost Prosperita 
Czech Rep. (CZ) USVIT Úsvit přímé demokracie Tomia Okamury 
 
Denmark (DK) B Det Radikale Venstre 
Denmark (DK) C Det Konservative Folkeparti 
Denmark (DK) I Liberal Alliance 
Denmark (DK) N Folkebevægelsen mod EU 
euandi. Project description and datasets documentation 
35 
Denmark (DK) O Dansk Folkeparti 
Denmark (DK) S Socialdemokraterne 
Denmark (DK) SF Socialistisk Folkeparti 
Denmark (DK) V Venstre 
 
Estonia (EE) EER Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised 
Estonia (EE) EKRE Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond 
Estonia (EE) IRL Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit 
Estonia (EE) KESK Keskerakond 
Estonia (EE) REF Reformierakond 
Estonia (EE) SDE Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond 
Estonia (EE) TARAND Indrek Tarand 
 
Finland (FI) KD Christian Democrats in Finland 
Finland (FI) KESK Centre Party of Finland 
Finland (FI) KOK National Coalition Party 
Finland (FI) MUUTOS2011 Change 2011 
Finland (FI) PIRAATTI Pirate Party of Finland 
Finland (FI) PS The Finns Party 
Finland (FI) SDP The Finnish Social Democratic Party 
Finland (FI) SFP Swedish People's Party in Finland 
Finland (FI) VAS The Left Alliance 
Finland (FI) VIHR Green League 
 
Flanders (FL) CDV Christen-Democratisch & Vlaams 
Flanders (FL) GROEN Groen 
Flanders (FL) NVA Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 
Flanders (FL) OVLD Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten 
Flanders (FL) PVDA Partij van de Arbeid 
Flanders (FL) SPA Socialistische Partij Anders 
Flanders (FL) VB Vlaams Belang 
 
France (FR) DLR Debout la République 
France (FR) EELV Europe Ecologie - Les Verts 
France (FR) FG Front de Gauche 
France (FR) FN Front National 
France (FR) LO Lutte Ouvrière 
France (FR) MRC Mouvement Républicain et Citoyen 
France (FR) NPA Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste 
France (FR) PS Parti Socialiste 
France (FR) UDIMODEM Union des Démocrates et Indépendants Modem 
France (FR) UMP Union pour un Mouvement Populaire 
 
Germany (DE) AFD Alternative für Deutschland 
Germany (DE) CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands 
Germany (DE) CSU Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern 
Germany (DE) FAMILIE Familien Partei Deutschlands 
Germany (DE) FDP Freie Demokratische Partei 
Germany (DE) FW Freie Wähler 
Germany (DE) GRUNEN Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 
Germany (DE) LINKE DIE LINKE 
Germany (DE) NPD Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
Germany (DE) PIRATEN Piratenpartei Deutschland 
Germany (DE) REP Die Republikaner 
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Germany (DE) SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
Germany (DE) TIERSCHUTZ Partei Mensch Umwelt Tierschutz 
   
Greece (EL) ANEL Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες 
Greece (EL) DIMAR Δημοκρατική Αριστερά 
Greece (EL) DRASSI Δράση 
Greece (EL) DX Δημιουργία Ξανά! 
Greece (EL) KKE Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας 
Greece (EL) LAOS Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός 
Greece (EL) ND Νέα Δημοκρατία 
Greece (EL) OP Οικολόγοι Πράσινοι 
Greece (EL) PASOK ΠΑΣΟΚ - Ελιά - Δημοκρατική Παράταξη 
Greece (EL) SYRIZA Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς 
Greece (EL) TOPOTAMI Το Ποτάμι 
Greece (EL) XA Χρυσή Αυγή 
 
Hungary (HU) DK Demokratikus Koalíció 
Hungary (HU) EGYUTT Együtt - Párbeszéd Magyarországért 
Hungary (HU) FIDESZ Fidesz  
Hungary (HU) JOBBIK Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom 
Hungary (HU) LMP Lehet Más a Politika 
Hungary (HU) MSZP Magyar Szocialista Párt 
 
Ireland (IE) FF Fianna Fail 
Ireland (IE) FG Fine Gael 
Ireland (IE) GP Green Party 
Ireland (IE) LP Labour Party 
Ireland (IE) SF Sinn Fein 
Ireland (IE) SP Socialist Party 
 
Italy (IT) FDI Fratelli d'Italia-Alleanza Nazionale 
Italy (IT) FI Forza Italia 
Italy (IT) GRI Green Italia 
Italy (IT) IDV Italia dei Valori 
Italy (IT) LN Lega Nord 
Italy (IT) M5S Movimento Cinque Stelle 
Italy (IT) NCD Nuovo Centro Destra 
Italy (IT) PD Partito Democratico 
Italy (IT) SEALDE Scelta Europea ALDE 
Italy (IT) TSIPRAS L'Altra Europa con Tsipras 
Italy (IT) UDC Unione di Centro 
 
Latvia (LV) ATTISTIBAI Latvijas attīstībai 
Latvia (LV) LKS Latvijas Krievu savienība  
Latvia (LV) LSP Latvijas Sociālistiskā partija  
Latvia (LV) SASKANA "Saskaņa" sociāldemokrātiskā partija 
Latvia (LV) TBLNNK Nacionālā apvienība "Visu Latvijai" – "TB/LNNK" 
Latvia (LV) VIENOTIBA Vienotība  
Latvia (LV) ZZS Zaļo un zemnieku savienība 
 
Lithuania (LT) DP Darbo partija 
Lithuania (LT) LLRA Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija 
Lithuania (LT) LRLS Lietuvos Respublikos liberalų sąjūdis 
Lithuania (LT) LSDP Lietuvos Socialdemokratų Partija 
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Lithuania (LT) LZP Lietuvos Žaliųjų partija 
Lithuania (LT) PTIT Partija Tvarka ir teisingumas 
Lithuania (LT) TSLKD Tėvynės sąjunga - Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai 
   
Luxembourg (LU) ADR Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei  
Luxembourg (LU) CSV CSV 
Luxembourg (LU) DP Demokratesch Partei 
Luxembourg (LU) GRENG déi gréng 
Luxembourg (LU) LENK déi Lénk 
Luxembourg (LU) LSAP LSAP 
Luxembourg (LU) PID Partei fir INTEGRAL Demokratie  
Luxembourg (LU) PIRATEN Parti Pirate Luxembourg  
 
Malta (MT) AD Alternattiva Demokratika 
Malta (MT) PL Partit Laburista 
Malta (MT) PN Partit Nazzjonalista 
 
Netherlands (NL) 50PLUS 50Plus Partij 
Netherlands (NL) CDA Christen Democratisch Appèl 
Netherlands (NL) CUSGP Christen Unie/Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij 
Netherlands (NL) D66 Democraten 66 
Netherlands (NL) GL GroenLinks 
Netherlands (NL) LIBDEM Liberaal Democratische Partij 
Netherlands (NL) PP Piratenpartij 
Netherlands (NL) PVDA Partij van de Arbeid 
Netherlands (NL) PVDD Partij voor de Dieren 
Netherlands (NL) PVV Partij voor de Vrijheid 
Netherlands (NL) SP Socialistische Partij 
Netherlands (NL) VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie 
 
Poland (PL) EUROPAPLUS Europa Plus Twój Ruch 
Poland (PL) KNP Kongres Nowej Prawicy 
Poland (PL) PIS Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 
Poland (PL) PO Platforma Obywatelska 
Poland (PL) PRJG Polska Razem Jarosława Gowina 
Poland (PL) PSL  Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe 
Poland (PL) SLD  Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej 
Poland (PL) SP Solidarna Polska 
 
Portugal (PT) AP Aliança Portugal 
Portugal (PT) BE Bloco de Esquerda 
Portugal (PT) CDU Coligação Democrática Unitária 
Portugal (PT) LIVRE LIVRE - Liberdade, Esquerda, Europa, Ecologia (L) 
Portugal (PT) MAS Movimento Alternativa Socialista 
Portugal (PT) PAN Partido pelos Animais e pela Natureza 
Portugal (PT) PCTP Partido Comunista dos Trabalhadores Portugueses 
Portugal (PT) PS Partido Socialista 
 
Romania (RO) FC Forța Civică 
Romania (RO) PDL Partidul Democrat Liberal 
Romania (RO) PMP Partidul Mişcarea Populară 
Romania (RO) PNL Partidul Național Liberal 
Romania (RO) PNȚCD Partidul Naţional Ţărănesc Creştin Democrat 
Romania (RO) PPDD Partidul Poporului-Dan Diaconescu 
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Romania (RO) PRM Partidul România Mare 
Romania (RO) PSD Partidul Social Democrat 
Romania (RO) UDMR Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România 
 
Slovakia (SK) KDH Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie 
Slovakia (SK) LSNS Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko 
Slovakia (SK) MOSTHID Most-Híd 
Slovakia (SK) NOVA Nová väčšina 
Slovakia (SK) OLANO Obyčajní ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti 
Slovakia (SK) SAS Sloboda a solidarita 
Slovakia (SK) SDKUDS Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia 
Slovakia (SK) SMERSD Smer - sociálna demokracia 
Slovakia (SK) SMKMKP Strana maďarskej komunity – Magyar Közösség Pártja 
Slovakia (SK) SNS Slovenská národná strana 
 
Slovenia (SI) DESUS Demokratična stranka upokojencev Slovenije 
Slovenia (SI) DL Državljanska lista 
Slovenia (SI) NSI Nova Slovenija – krščanski demokrati 
Slovenia (SI) PS Pozitivna Slovenija 
Slovenia (SI) SD Socialni demokrati 
Slovenia (SI) SDS Slovenska demokratska stranka 
Slovenia (SI) SLS Slovenska ljudska stranka 
Slovenia (SI) SOLIDARNOST Solidarnost, za pravično družbo 
Slovenia (SI) ZL Zdruzena levica 
 
Spain (ES) IU Izquierda Unida 
Spain (ES) PP Partido Popular  
Spain (ES) PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Espagnol 
Spain (ES) UPYD Union Progreso y Democracia 
 
Sweden (SE) C Centerpartiet 
Sweden (SE) FI Feministiskt initiativ 
Sweden (SE) FP Folkpartiet liberalerna 
Sweden (SE) KD Kristdemokraterna 
Sweden (SE) M Moderaterna 
Sweden (SE) MP Miljöpartiet de gröna 
Sweden (SE) PP Piratpartiet 
Sweden (SE) SAP Arbetarepartiet-Socialdemokraterna 
Sweden (SE) SD Sverigedemokraterna 
Sweden (SE) V Vänsterpartiet 
 
United Kingdom (UK) BNP British National Party 
United Kingdom (UK) CON Conservative Party 
United Kingdom (UK) DUP Democratic Unionist Party 
United Kingdom (UK) GP Green Party 
United Kingdom (UK) LAB Labour Party 
United Kingdom (UK) LIB Liberal Democrats 
United Kingdom (UK) PC Plaid Cymru 
United Kingdom (UK) SDLP Social Democratic and Labour Party 
United Kingdom (UK) SF Sinn Féin 
United Kingdom (UK) SGP Scottish Green Party 
United Kingdom (UK) SNP Scottish National Party 
United Kingdom (UK) UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party 
United Kingdom (UK) UUP Ulster Unionist Party 
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Walonia (WA) CDH Centre Démocrate Humaniste 
Walonia (WA) ECOLO Ecolo 
Walonia (WA) FDF Fédéralistes Démocrates Francophones 
Walonia (WA) MR Mouvement Réformateur 
Walonia (WA) PS Parti Socialiste 
 
  
Diego Garzia, Alexander H. Trechsel, Lorenzo De Sio and Andrea De Angelis 
40 
Appendix C 
The matching algorithm 
In order to calculate the actual degree of match between the user and the parties, we programmed an 
algorithm in which numerical values are first assigned to single answers of political parties and the 
user (see Table B1). 
Table B1. Comparison of the answers 
 
On each statement, an accordance score between the user and each of the political parties is calculated 
according to two criteria: (1) whether the user and party are in accordance on the side (agreement vs. 
disagreement) taken on the statement (both on the same side – or both neutral, one neutral and one 
taking a side, opposite sides); and (2) considering the party-voter difference, calculated according to 
the above values. An accordance score is then assigned to each combination of the two criteria (see 
Table B2). 
Table 6. Sides taken on the statement by user and party 
 
Note: Accordance scores correspond to ratios of integer numbers between 0 and 4 
Accordance scores on single statements (as calculated above) are then averaged, in order to obtain the 
overall voter-party accordance score shown in the match list visualization. The average is calculated 
by first summing up the above mentioned accordance scores on all statements, and dividing the result 
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by the number of calculated accordance scores.
16
 Statements marked by the voter as more important or 
less important than others are assigned a different weight in the above calculation of the overall 
accordance score. In particular: statements marked as more important count as two (the accordance 
score is multiplied by 2); statements marked as less important count as half (the accordance score is 
multiplied by 0.5). The final average is calculated by dividing the overall sum by the weighted number 
of calculated accordance scores (counting each more important statement as two statements, and each 
less important statement as half a statement). 
  
                                                     
16
 Note that statements where the user has “no opinion” are not included in the calculation. Statements were the party has 
“no opinion” are treated as if the party had a “neutral position”. 
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Appendix D 
euandi user dataset – variable coding 
 
 
[userid]    
Unique user-ID 
 
 
[startdate]   
Day and time when user started answering the questionnaire 
(format: YYYY-MM-DD hh:mm:ss) 
 
 
[enddate] 
Day and time when user finished answering the questionnaire 
(format: YYYY-MM-DD hh:mm:ss) 
 
 
[nutsnaz]    
User’s geo-localization based on IP address: Nation 
(for detailed country codes see variable [country] below) 
 
 
[nutsarea] 
User’s geo-localization based on IP address: Province (NUTS-3) 
 
 
[country] 
Version of the country questionnaire chosen by the user: 
 
1 Belgium: Dutch electoral college 
2 Belgium: French Electoral College 
3 Czech Republic 
4 Denmark 
5 Germany 
6 Estonia 
7 Spain 
8 France 
9 Croatia 
10 Ireland 
11 Italy 
12 Latvia 
13 Luxemburg 
14 Lithuania 
17 Hungary 
18 Malta 
19 Netherlands 
20 Austria 
21 Poland 
22 Portugal 
23 Romania 
euandi. Project description and datasets documentation 
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25 Slovenia 
26 Slovakia 
28 Finland 
29 Sweden 
32 United Kingdom: England 
33 United Kingdom: Northern Ireland 
34 United Kingdom: Scotland 
35 United Kingdom: Wales 
36 Greece 
37 Cyprus 
38 Bulgaria 
 
 
[fblogin]    
 
0 No 
1 Yes 
 
 
[gender]    
 
1  Male  
2  Female 
.  No Answer 
 
 
[age] 
    
1 <16 
2 16-17 
3 18-24 
4 25-34 
5 35-44 
6 45-54 
7 55-64 
8 65+ 
. No Answer 
 
 
[educ] 
 
1 Pre-primary 
2 Primary 
3 Lower secondary 
4 Upper secondary 
5 Post-secondary non-tertiary 
6 First stage tertiary 
7 Second stage tertiary 
. No Answer 
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[coordx] 
User’s position in the “My Political Space” visualization – Axis X 
Values range from -1 (socio-economic left) to +1 (socio-economic right) 
 
 
[coordy] 
User’s position in the “My Political Space” visualization – Axis Y 
Values range from -1 (anti-EU integration) to +1 (pro-EU integration) 
 
 
[coordz] 
User’s position in the “My Political Space” visualization – Axis Z 
Values range from -1 (liberal values) to +1 (traditional values) 
 
 
[answer_*]   
 
0 No Opinion 
1 Completely disagree 
2 Tend to disagree 
3 Neutral 
4 Tend to agree 
5 Completely agree 
 
 
[imp_*] 
 
-1 Least important issue 
0 Default importance 
1 Most important issue 
 
 
[pmatch_*]  
 
Degree of match (%) between the user and a given party, theoretically ranging from 0 (no match) to 
100 (perfect match). Variable name identifies the party as follows: 
 
pmatch_countryacronim_partyacronim 
example: German SPD corresponds to [pmatch_de_spd] 
 
 
[ptv_*] 
 
User’s propensity to vote for a given party in his country of choice, ranging from 0 (‘not probable at 
all’) to 10 (‘very probable’). Variable name identifies the party as follows: 
 
ptv_countryacronim_partyacronim 
example: German SPS corresponds to [ptv_de_spd] 
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